The solutions I offer are ignored. Might it be because these provide too little business to expertize and redistribution profiteers?
Before the 2007-08 crisis there was some economic growth resulting from a big expansion of credit, which was fed by some very low capital requirements to banks and that allowed these to, in some cases, leverage their equity over 50 to 1.
Then disaster struck, as a consequence of excessive exposures to what had very little capital requirements, like loans to sovereigns (Greece), investments in AAA rated securities and the financing of houses.
In panic, floods of money, for instance by means of QEs, were poured over the economies, with little results to show for it, and now, the most important world economies, are stuck. Any additional stimuli, be it by means of public borrowing for infrastructure projects, QEs or low or negative interest rates will only complicate matters much more... like for pension plans.
The truth is that trying to get strong and sustainable economic growth, while keeping in place credit risk-adverse capital requirements for banks that exclude SMEs and entrepreneurs from fair access to bank credit, is just impossible.
What to do?
1. Very carefully remove the risk-weighted capital requirements for banks that distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. In order to make sure banks have sufficient capital while adapting, and that credit is not constrained, central banks could offer to purchase some of their bad portfolios, with the understanding that no dividends would be paid until these portfolios had been repurchased by the banks. (See what Chile did)
2. Create new demand (and lessen inequalities), by means of 100% tax-funded Universal Basic Income schemes. One of these could, if funded with carbon taxes, also help with environmental sustainability.
I have been arguing against the risk weighted capital requirements for banks for soon two decades, and I have explained many of its mistakes over and over again. I have yet not been able to obtain one single answer from those responsible, like from the Basel Committee or the Financial Stability Board. Could it be because they have no answers?
Or could it be that my counter proposals are too straightforward, to simple, and would therefore erode the earnings potential of bank regulators (and consultants), of climate change and inequality fighters, and of the general expertize and redistribution profiteers?
Or is it that I just don’t know what I am talking
about? It could be, though I think I can prove I do know by means of somecertifiable early opinions on these issues.