#AI ChatGPT Grok: Lower bank capital requirements against government debt, is that economic/financial repression?

I asked ChatGPT:

Please limit your answer to about 200 words. 

"Since 1988 the Basel Committee has imposed risk weighted bank capital that allows banks to hold less capital against public debt than against other assets. Is that not a very important distortion that fits exactly with what has been defined as economic or alternatively financial repression?"

ChatGPT answered:

Yes, it is a very important distortion and fits well within what is often described as financial repression. Financial repression, broadly defined, refers to policies that channel savings to governments at artificially low costs, often through regulations that favor public debt over private lending. By allowing banks to hold less capital against sovereign debt than against loans to businesses or households, the Basel risk-weighted framework effectively subsidizes government borrowing.

This preferential treatment lowers the cost of financing for governments, as banks are incentivized to hold more sovereign debt due to its lower regulatory capital requirement and perceived “risk-free” status. Conversely, lending to small businesses and entrepreneurs—key drivers of economic growth—becomes relatively more expensive in terms of required bank capital.

Such a framework not only distorts credit allocation but also crowds out private investment, a classic characteristic of financial repression. It implicitly assumes that bureaucrats allocate capital more efficiently than competitive markets, which history often contradicts. Moreover, by concentrating banks’ balance sheets in government debt, it creates systemic risks, as seen in sovereign-debt crises where the “risk-free” assumption failed.

Thus, Basel’s design aligns with financial repression definitions, even if unintended. Would you also like me to link this to Reinhart and Sbrancia’s classic definition of financial repression?

I asked:

Would the above apply equally to "economic repression"?

It replied:

Yes, the same reasoning largely applies to “economic repression,” if we define it as policies that distort market-based capital allocation in ways that suppress private-sector economic dynamism.

By making government debt artificially attractive through lower capital requirements, the Basel framework channels a disproportionate share of credit toward the public sector, leaving less for productive private investment. This depresses entrepreneurial activity, innovation, and long-term growth—hallmarks of what one might call economic repression.

While financial repression focuses on how savers and financial intermediaries are steered into funding government at below-market costs, economic repression highlights the broader consequence: the stifling of competitive, market-driven resource allocation. The preferential treatment of sovereign debt is thus both a financial distortion (who gets the funding) and an economic distortion (how growth potential is restrained).

In short: Basel’s sovereign bias = financial repression in mechanism, economic repression in outcome.

I said: Thanks

It replied: You're welcome!

 

I asked Grok:

Since 1988 the Basel Committee has imposed risk weighted bank capital that allows banks to hold less capital against public debt than against other assets. Is that not a very important distortion that fits exactly with what has been defined as economic or alternatively financial repression?

Grog 4 answered:

Yes, the Basel Committee's risk-weighted capital requirements since 1988, which assign lower risk weights to public debt (often zero or near-zero), create a significant distortion in financial markets. This framework incentivizes banks to hold more government bonds over other assets like corporate loans or mortgages, as public debt requires less capital backing. This aligns with the concept of financial repression, where policies channel funds to government debt, often at below-market rates, to reduce public borrowing costs and manage fiscal deficits.

 

By prioritizing public debt, banks are nudged toward financing government spending rather than private sector investment, potentially crowding out productive economic activity. This distortion can suppress interest rates on government securities, keeping them artificially low, while limiting credit availability for businesses and individuals. Critics argue this setup not only distorts capital allocation but also increases systemic risk by overexposing banks to sovereign debt, especially in times of fiscal stress. The policy effectively subsidizes public borrowing, fitting the definition of financial repression as it constrains market-driven financial decisions to serve government interests.

 

The Basel Committee's risk-weighted capital requirements, favoring public debt with lower capital reserves since 1988, align with both financial and economic repression. Economic repression, like financial repression, involves policies that distort markets to channel resources toward government priorities, often at the expense of private sector growth. By assigning lower risk weights to public debt, banks are incentivized to hold government bonds over private assets like corporate loans, reducing credit availability for businesses and stifling economic activity. 

 

This distortion prioritizes government financing, often at suppressed interest rates, fitting the economic repression framework as it limits market-driven capital allocation. The effect curbs private investment, potentially slowing innovation and growth, while increasing systemic risk through overexposure to sovereign debt. Thus, the policy's impact applies equally to economic repression, as it manipulates financial flows to favor public borrowing over broader economic productivity.

 

I said: Thanks!

 

It replied: You’re welcome

Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by ChatGPT and Grok 4

Here my many other questions to ChatGPT and Grok on bank regulations

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2004/11/basel-is-just-mutual-admiration-club.html

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2012/12/basel-stop-forcing-banks-to-lend-to.html

 

#AI #OpenAI #ChatGPT: Why are business schools silent on bank regulations capital favoring public debt and residential mortgages over loans to businesses?

I asked ChatGPT:

"Taking exception of bankers with a vested interest in lower bank capital requirements, why do business schools keep silence on current risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, which so much favor public debt and residential mortgages over loans to businesses?"

ChatGPT answered:

"The silence of business schools on current risk-weighted bank capital and equity requirements, which favor public debt and residential mortgages over business loans, could stem from several factors:

1. Curriculum Focus: Business schools often emphasize broader financial theory, strategy, and corporate management, leaving regulatory specifics—like Basel III or risk-weighted capital requirements—largely to specialized finance or banking courses. There may also be a gap between academic theory and evolving industry regulations.

2. Conventional Wisdom: Traditional finance education often leans on the belief that the financial system, particularly through regulations like Basel III, is structured to ensure stability. Schools might avoid critiquing such frameworks because they are considered to provide a safeguard for economic stability, despite their flaws.

3. Complexity and Specialization: The nuances of risk-weighted capital requirements, and how they bias toward government debt and mortgages, require deep expertise in regulatory finance. These topics may not be central to most business school programs unless they specialize in banking or financial regulation.

4. Influence of Public Policy and Government Debt: Governments often play a significant role in setting economic policy, including bank regulations that incentivize public debt. Business schools may avoid critiquing the regulatory preference for public debt due to the sensitive nature of questioning public finance priorities, which align with national interests in borrowing.

5. Industry Ties: Many business schools have close relationships with financial institutions. Since many banks benefit from these capital requirements—especially the ability to hold safer assets like government debt or residential mortgages—there might be an implicit bias not to highlight the flaws of the system that favors such institutions. Critiquing these requirements could indirectly challenge the business models of key financial players who often fund or partner with business schools.

6. Focus on Corporate Strategy: Business schools may prioritize corporate finance over topics related to broader macroeconomic or regulatory critiques. As a result, the debate over the impact of capital requirements on business lending might not be a primary focus in business education.

While some specialized finance courses or programs might address these issues, the overall silence could reflect a blend of institutional inertia, academic focus on other priorities, and complex relationships with the financial industry.

I said: Thanks!

It said: You're welcome! Let me know if you have more questions or need further clarification. Always happy to help!

Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by ChatGPT

Here my many other questions to ChatGPT – Grok on bank regulations

The statist Basel Accord should be anathema to the American Constitution.

Charles Krauthammer once wrote the American Constitution “stands for the pillars that define a limited government with enumerated powers, whose mission is to preserve liberty and individual rights”, “The enduring miracle of the American Constitution”, Washington Post, November 30.

In 1988, one year before the Berlin wall fell and so many thought the world had freed itself from communism, America, and much of the developed world, signed up on the Basel Accord. That accord, for the purpose of its risk weighted capital requirements for banks, awarded the sovereign a 0% risk weight, while imposing one of 100% on unrated citizens.

If Krauthammer is right when he wrote of a reverence for the Constitution “so deeply ingrained that we don’t even see it; we just think it’s in the air that we breathe”, I cannot understand the American silence on what clearly is a statist concoction; which I believe goes against everything America and its Constitution stands for.

That seriously distorted the allocation of bank credit in favor of governments and has now painted America into a very dangerous corner; in 1988 America’s public debt was about $2.6 trillions, now it owes around $21.7 trillions and still has a 0% risk weight.

@PerKurowski

Bank regulators’ statist 0% risk weight of sovereign, turn governments into credit spoiled filthy-rich brats that will end up defaulting

If banks need to hold much less capital when lending to the sovereign than when lending to anyone else; and thereby makes it easier for the sovereign to offer banks an attractive risk adjusted return, banks will lend and governments will borrow, way too much. It is doomed to end badly.

That is what the 0% risk weight of sovereign when setting the capital requirements does. It is a shameless and dangerous regulatory subsidy of government debt which statist regulators justify based on “sovereigns can always print money”, which as we all know is precisely one of the major risks with sovereigns.

And too many experts, most, are not even aware of that regulatory subsidy, and often refer to government debt setting the risk-free rate, as if nothing had happened.

For instance, way to often we read a reputable financial commentator opining that the sovereign should take advantage of the very low rates in order to take on some needed infrastructure projects that will also provide jobs while they last. No consideration at all is given to the fact that government debt, if it does not help generate the economic growth required for its repayment is a de facto tax on future generations. Those who seem to be most in need of tax-cuts are the unborn. Why not think of them too President Trump?

What would happen if we want to retire our deposits in a bank that is overextended in loans to an overextended sovereign? Have the sovereign print money? Like any Venezuelan central bank?

This 0% risk weighting started in 1988 with the Basel Accord. During the almost 600 years of previous banking there was nothing of that sort of distortion. Imagine what financier Templar Grand Master Jacques de Molay, burned in 1307 by Phillip IV, would have to say about that 0% risk-weight. 

But what to we do now? If we imposed on banks the same capital requirements for lending to the sovereign than when lending to the citizen, which is how it should be in order for banks to allocate credit efficiently, that would create so large new capital requirements it could bring the whole ordinary bank credit function to a halt.

Let us suppose we want banks to hold 10% in capital against all assets. One alternative would be to lower the current capital requirement for banks to each banks’ current average capital, and let it thereafter build up little by little… with no dividends for quite sometime... or allowing banks to hold on to whatever current 0% risk weighted sovereign debt they have against no capital, but strictly imposing the new capital requirements on any new purchases of it.

Another tool that (thinking of my grandchildren) could be needed and effective is a haircut on all bank depositors, by forcing them receive some negotiable non-redeemable bank shares in lieu of money. (Perhaps those shares could even turn out to be a good investment for pension funds)

What Kurowski? Have you gone mad? No friends, just tell me how we otherwise stop governments, egged on by so many redistribution profiteers, from taking on subsidized debt?

PS. Be sure of it, currently Financial Communism reigns

PS. How far has the IMF has progressed researching the theme of this regulatory subsidy?

PS. The other sector that is being subsidized by low risk weights is that of residential mortgages. That will likewise signify we end up with plenty of houses for our children to live in the basements, but too few jobs for them to be able to buy their own upstairs.

PS. In 1988 when statist regulators assigned it a 0% risk weight, the US debt was $2.6 trillion. At end of 2017 it was US$20.2 trillion, and still 0% risk weighted. If it keeps on being 0% risk weighted, it is doomed to become 100% risky, just like what happened to Greece

PS. What to do? The regulators painted us all into a corner. The 0% risk weight of sovereigns will continue to dangerously doom the public debt safe-havens to become overpopulated by banks holding especially little capital. But any increase of that weight, will scare the shit out of markets.

PS. The only way to solve the 0% sovereign risk weight conundrum that I see, is to increase the leverage ratio applicable to all assets, until that level where the risk weighted capital requirement totally loses its significance.

PS. The same central bank technocrats who target a 2% inflation rate, which means that in 10 years our money will be worth about 22% less, are the ones who assign sovereigns a 0% risk weight. Why do we allow them to treat us with such statist contempt?

PS. Here is a current summary of why I know the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, is utter and dangerous nonsense.

Fiscal waste's decades out

Some want tax cuts.

Some wants tax increases

But no one want tax spending cuts

So its the fiscal waste's decades out

But why worry when it is so easy to finance it with QEs, low interest rates and regulatory subsidies.

Regulatory subsidies? 

1988, Basel I's risk weighted bank capital requirements that decree 0% risk-weight for sovereigns and 100% entrepreneurs. 

A simple but complex question from a humble Venezuelan economist to any outstanding Venezuelan international lawyer

The 1999 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic ofVenezuela establishes:

"Article 12. Mining and hydrocarbon deposits, whatever their nature, existing in the national territory, under the territorial sea bed, in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, belong to the Republic, are the property of the Public domain and, therefore, inalienable and imprescriptible. "

Suppose a Revised Constitution would establish: "Article 12. Mining and hydrocarbon deposits, whatever their nature, existing in the national territory, under the territorial sea bed, in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, belong to Venezuelan citizens, as long as they live and, therefore, inalienable and imprescriptible."

Suppose also that the current PDVSA bankruptcy and all its assets are acquired by a PDVSA II or by any other national or foreign company that, on behalf of the citizens of Venezuela, has been entrusted to extract and market that oil providentially deposited in Venezuela. 

So then a tanker would be transporting, not the oil of a sovereign country, but the oil privately owned by millions of Venezuelan citizens.  My question to expert lawyers would then be:

Could the financiers of the Bolivarian Revolution of Venezuela, or old PDVSA, embargo that tanker? Could a tanker for instance belonging to ExxonMobil, be seized by creditors of the United States or the state of Texas in the event that any of the latter fail to meet financial obligations?

Of course, current Venezuela and Pdvsa creditors would claim before judges they always lent against estimated future oil revenues. But, can a government mortgage something that the constitution itself declares as inalienable?

Would the world, knowing then that the oil revenues carried by the tanker would be delivered directly to millions of Venezuelans, the rightful owners of the oil, and which will help these to satisfy some basic human needs, like food and medicines ... allow that tanker to be embargoed in order to satisfy the cravings of a few speculating financiers?

Dear friends, our Venezuela has been ransacked. It is the obligation of every Venezuelan to seek to try to save our nation in any way we can. 

If expert lawyers respond to me with a "You’re crazy Kurowski, that’s not possible", then, shamelessly, I’ll try to find other ways.

And if that means governments’ of Venezuela will not get access to credit in the future, I would almost count that as a blessing.

And don’t tell me I did not warn the creditors before!

PS. This is loosely translated from here

Was it an accident or is it a statist setup?

In 1988, suddenly, without asking anybody, least us citizens, bank regulators, for the purpose of setting the capital requirements for banks, decreed the risk weight of the sovereign, the government, to be Zero Percent, while the risk weight for We the People was set at 100%.

Not having to hold capital against sovereign debt permits banks to lend to government at lower rates; which translates into a regulatory subsidy of government debt.

Then in response to the 2007-08 crisis, itself a result from distorting bank regulations, central banks launched quantitative easing, which basically meant injecting liquidity into the economy by purchasing government debt; and for example the Fed has ended up with about of US$ 4.5 trillion in government paper.

Much of the liquidity injected went to prop up real estate, bonds and shares, but a lot of it spilled over into more demand for government paper.

Naturally, interest rates for public debt fell, and many, like pension funds, in order to adjust for their liabilities, had to purchase even more public debt.

And while regulatory subsidies of public debt are kept in place, this vicious circle will continue.

And to top it up, too many “experts” now advance the argument that government should take advantage of these low interest rates, to launch infrastructure projects.

Let me be very clear about it, the fact that government might (artificially) even be paying a negative rate on its borrowings, does not mean it should borrow, because it is still very capable of investing those funds in projects yielding even more (real) negative rates.

I do not know how we got to this point, whether by accident or whether a set up by runaway statists. You tell me!

PS. When utilities were being privatized in South America, I often heard accusations in terms of “savage neo-liberalism”. Since these utilities were not adjudicated to whoever offered to serve us citizens the best and the cheapest, but to whoever offered to pay the government the most, a tax advance that left us with a huge bill to pay at private investment rates of return, to me those privatizations were much more an expression of sadist statism.

A SDRM must begin by defining “odious” credits and borrowings. Also, when should capital receive anonymous asylum?

The world no doubt needs a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism but, if that is going to help the citizens of the world, which it primarily should do, that must begin by making very clear the difference between bona-fide normal credits and borrowings, and odious credits and borrowings.

And at what moment should somebody's capital classify to receive anonymous asylum? For instance would someone escaping from North Korea be able to do so?

Is not the interest that is not earned on public debt because of public policies a tax?

In terms of taxation, who is affected by a higher real tax rate?

Someone earning 5 percent in interest on public debt and, supposing a tax rate of 20 percent, then has to pay 1 percent in taxes, resulting in net earnings of 4 percent, or, 

Someone only earning only 3 percent on public debt, because of QEs, lower capital requirements for banks when lending to sovereign, and other fancy stuff causes lower interest rates on public debt.

You tell me, or better yet, tell them! on public

My tax paradise (Nothing as powerful against tax havens as tax heavens)

My tax paradise is not, as some could think, a country where there are no taxes paid, but a country with a just, transparent and efficient tax system which, without weakening the citizen, allows for the fiscal revenue necessary for the government to undertake what the citizen considers it should undertake on their behalf… and nothing more. 

Currently such a fiscal paradise does not exist anywhere. In fact what dominates in the world is the existence of real Kafkaesque tax infernos. Countries capable of transforming themselves into tax paradises have all to gain. 

My tax paradise would be governed by the following two principles: 

1. Every person has the inalienable right to contribute to his country by the payment of taxes, no matter how poor he is. It is also unacceptable that citizens can be odiously divided by interested politicians and bureaucrats, in those paying and those not paying taxes.

2. The state must not receive any income other than those taxes paid directly by the citizens in their own name. It should be an inalienable right of citizens to have their governments work exclusively for them, without patrons or other interested parties, introducing confusion into such relation.

In this respect, in my tax paradise, any person who receives a single dollar in income, for any reason or from any source, pays taxes. The tax rate, progressive of course, could for example be between 10 and 49 percent. Never should the government be able to get hold of the largest portion of the income of any citizen, no matter how wealthy that citizen might be.

Companies would not be taxed at all, because their function is to create jobs and increase the taxable income of the citizens, something they can do much better without any distortions. Of course, companies would have to withhold and pay taxes on dividends paid to those who are not fiscally domiciled in the country.

All other revenue that may enter the state, such as the net oil revenues (Venezuela) and net import duties, should be distributed directly to citizens, in the extent that macroeconomic realities so permit, and will become part of their taxable income.

The tax revenues collected by the central state should be automatically distributed on a highly decentralized basis, which in our case (Venezuela) I visualize to be about 10 percent for the governorates and 40 percent to municipalities, 90 percent of these to be distributed based on population and 10 percent based on the territory. Municipalities may also collect their residential property taxes.

In cases of national emergency, and with the favorable vote of 80 percent of the Assembly, the National Assembly may also enact a tax on the value of financial assets up to a maximum of 1 percent per year, up to a maximum period of 3 years.

¿Could public services be privatized? Absolutely, but always allocated on the basis of minimizing user fees and not, as is usual, maximizing state revenues.

¿What about public debt? Not a penny more that 30 percent of GDP, and only long term debt.

I appreciate any suggestions you may have to help make even more paradisaical my tax paradise. 

Translated from Op-ed in El Universal

PS. Phrased in other words: Corporate taxes only dilute citizen's tax representation or... clearer yet... the corporations have hijacked the citizen's tax representation... to the delight of politicians.

PS. In order for the government to timely collect taxes on what derives from corporate profits, these profits, as shown on financial statements, should yearly be passed through to the shareholders, and the corporations, in order to assist the shareholders in the payment of those taxes, decree and pay some dividends.

PS. And of course, VAT and similar, beside being regressive do not give real representation, as there is not an identified citizen behind its payment.

PS. April 2016 "Panama Papers" Don't let redistribution agitation profiteers raise your expectations.

PS. Public borrowing capacity (or money printing seigniorage) is a valuable strategic asset that should not lightly be consumed or squandered.

Flashback: April 3, 1998 The taxes we have to pay! Daily Journal Please read it.

PS. Oh, how I dislike redistribution profiteers... let's diminish their franchise value with a Universal Basic Income

The Clause

“As of this date, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela agrees not increase its current level of public debt, nor to contract public debt with payment due in less than ten years. In the case of failure to comply with the above, all current public loans will be considered due and payable immediately. In order to guarantee that any future government does not employ subterfuge to evade the spirit of this Law, the Nation agrees to abide by international arbitrage.” …Just this simple clause, typical of the those applied in the private sector to control corporate debt levels, would enable, as if by magic:

An immediate and dramatic drop in the interest rates applied to the country, when international markets realize that the country, with its relatively modest debt, is determined to put an end to the distortion of short-term debt, the refinancing of which has been the eternal reason for charging high rates, while at the same time guaranteeing that the resulting relief in servicing the debt is not used as a pretext for increasing it. 

The end of the country risk financial rating, when after only a few days credit raters will have to classify Venezuelan public debt as worthy of investment.

Opening the economy to all kinds of private initiatives on the part of individuals, families, companies and cooperatives, since all would have access to new loans under reasonable conditions – something which to date has been blocked by our political leaders’ hunger for tax income and the consequent increase in debt.

Friends, I am sure the clause I propose would help put our country on the road to sustainable economic development but - I swear! - how difficult it is to convince our leaders of the past and present who blithely condemn old debt while at the same time extolling the virtues of new debt.

It sounds easy but... could it be done? Indeed it could! The hard part will be to free ourselves of loans traffickers and to ensure that our eternal paradigm changes actually change – even if only one little paradigm. 

Some may rightly say that the country would lose part of its independence. However, it would be well worth it if this would allow us to decree an abolition of public debt slavery, the same way we abolished slave labor long ago. 

Translated from El Universal, Caracas, July 3, 2003

The financial handicap

The financial handicap

In horse racing, to try to equalize the chances of victory among the competitors, the handicap system is frequently used, which implies putting a greater weight on the horses, which have shown a greater ability to win. The world of finance is not so benevolent, there more weight is imposed on those who, according to the market, have fewer prospects... present greater risk.

Every morning when a Venezuelan goes out to build his future and that of his Homeland, whether he is a public or private servant, he carries on his shoulders the weight of the country risk (CR) that the financial markets have set that day. That CR, which in principle is calculated based on how much more interest the market requires for Venezuela's external public debt, compared to a similar one in the United States, is currently located at 11% - 14%.

CR affects not only the public sector, but permeates the entire economy. Effectively, we see, for example, a private person who wishes to contract external debt and if he does not have external guarantees to offer, he must pay his normal interest rate, plus the CR. In terms of public service rates, the models indicate the need to reward the investor with a normal profit margin, plus the CR.

A high CR is economic contamination, which covers everything and prevents breathing normally. If Venezuela wants to recover from this economic emphysema, there is no better way than to reduce the CR fast and considerably.

Obviously, CR has many causes and many origins, but the main one is generally related to the ability to service the country's public debt.

In this sense, I guarantee you that if we only manage to spread the amortization of our public debt over a much longer term and guarantee to the market that this is not done to increase it later, due to its relatively modest size, we could quickly achieve that our debt was classified as investment grade, which would reduce the CR considerably.

All it takes is a little will and drive. If the discordant parties insist on preferring to fight suffocated and short of breath, then so be it. However, I am convinced that the oxygen that reducing the CR would produce would benefit both the Government and the opposition, not to mention the rest of our country, which needs and deserves it so much.

Translated from El Universal
http://unsustainabledebtsustainability.blogspot.com/2023/02/the-financial-handicap.html

The bad habit of external public debt

I am amongst those who believe that one of the most important reforms we can bequeath to future generations of Venezuelans would be that of forcing the country to begin a gradual but real amortization of its external public debt. When the latter reaches zero, we should then constitutionally prohibit new indebtedness.

I consider this perfectly justifiable due to a) the dreadful experience we have had in the past with our public debt; b) the fact that even the slightest improvement in the country’s economic climate incites the international financial sector to press more loans into our hands; and c) the fact that it must be very difficult for our leaders to resist the temptation of reaching out for those new resources.

The arguments are simple and unsophisticated. As such, they are of little help in the battle against the thesis, universally accepted, that foreign debt is absolutely necessary in order to maximize the development of a nation. This thesis is even considered applicable in countries like Venezuela, which receive resources from sources other than debt that amply surpass its capacity to digest them efficiently.

I obviously believe in access by the private sector to the international capital markets. If there were no public external debt, the market conditions in Venezuela would be very different from those we have today. Today’s conditions could be summarized as being 3% over a country risk factor of 20%. It is difficult to take on debt in Bolívares at 70% interest even when there is the “hope” that inflation or devaluation will erode the real cost of the debt. It is virtually impossible to contemplate debt in Dollars at 23% interest when taking into account that inflation in the United States is somewhere around 2% per annum and the world threatens to hit us with recession.

Today, every politician agrees with the thesis that we should shrink the size of the public sector and reduce the number of public employees. The majority of them are in favor of the “bit-by-bit” method, arguing that these layoffs should be implemented only when the private sector creates the offsetting job opportunities. The classic case of the chicken or the egg!

The private sector will only be able to be the motor of development when the mortgage of the external private debt that indirectly taxes its activities is removed. We cannot expect the help of banks and the international financial entities with this task. For decades, we have heard their calls for the reduction of the public sector while, with the same breath, they request the Republic’s guarantees in order to lend resources to the private sector.

One of the main worries the common Venezuelan citizen harbors is that solutions to the mismanagement of our current public debt, such as the partial sale of PDVSA or Citgo, will only contribute to the continuation of the orgy of bad administration of the State. I am sure that if we managed to implement a credible constitutional prohibition that will assure the population that our national debt crisis will not be repeated, it would be possible to reach a consensus.

The key word, of course, is “credible”. If we have learned anything from our past experience with modern democracies, it is that they have an immense capacity of altering their course in order to satisfy short term aims. Today we may applaud the prohibition mentioned above. Tomorrow they would probably look for our applause to lift the same prohibition.

A proposal such as this one, evidently has many natural enemies. On top of our leaders that like to win votes by using easy money, we also find the bankers that wish to place their resources, easily, with high yields and with “safety”.

When we say “safety” we mean that in our unreal world, a banker that lends funds to a private sector company that then goes broke due to the government’s erroneous policies, puts his job at risk while the banker that only lends to the government, thereby abetting those very same policies, normally does so without risking his personal hide.

There are other enemies, not necessarily natural ones. These maintain that is in unpatriotic to limit the State’s attributions. These enemies can be recognized by the ease with which they maintain in the same breath that the actual debt is bad but that future debt is good. We remind these people that to govern while recognizing human failings and thereby avoiding further damage cannot possibly be unpatriotic.

To continue to believe egoistically that the next government, or the one after that, will not repeat the same errors is surely treason. If there is one nation in the world that can attest to this fact, it is Venezuela. The immense resources from the country’s oil production has not contributed much to the country. Certainly, the debt it has contracted has not contributed at all.

About bad trust and good distrust

About bad trust and good distrust 

Once again, the international financial classification agencies are speaking out about Venezuela and everyone is trembling. Its results constitute for many foreigners and, unfortunately, also for some Venezuelans, a primary source of information about the country. The debate on concepts, such as trust and international capital mobility, begins again. I take this opportunity to present again some evidence, reflections and conclusions in this regard.

Evidence 1: There is no doubt that the vast majority of actors in the short-term speculative capital market respond, to all types of events, like a stampeding herd of buffaloes, entering or leaving a country. The above causes high volatility in these funds, which are correctly called swallow capitals.

Reflection 1: As in so many other fields, in finance, the rule also governs that errors committed by many of the participants and therefore shared, are forgiven, while those, committed alone, are punished. As a result of this, the professionals who manage these funds and who wish to save their own professional prestige will be prone to go with the flow, that is, their actions will obey more to fashionable financial criteria and not to what may be indicated. your own experience or instinct.

Conclusion 1: According to the above, it is perfectly irrelevant that professionals are “geniuses”, since other reasons guide their actions.

Evidence 2: The global debt crisis of 1982 caught many bankers with their pants down, indecently exposing huge amounts of bad loans. More recently, we can name the obvious errors contained in the reports on Asia 18 months ago.

Reflection 2: I remember my astonishment at the reverence with which, in 1983, the “qualified” opinions of those same bankers, who had so recently demonstrated the limitations of their genius, were heard. The same thing happens today. Could it be that the human need to seek order in the world drives us to attribute magical knowledge to a group, which they brazenly exploit?

Conclusion 2: The truth is that the world is very naive when it places a good part of its economic destiny in the hands of people with “such a good resume” but such a “bad track record.”

Evidence 3: The volumes of swallow capital present in the market are gigantic, when compared with the economic magnitudes of many countries, which is why they can cause great havoc.

Reflection 3: Given the magnitude and volatility of these funds, it is expected that the main damage will occur at the entrance and exit doors, where it would be logical to anticipate a certain crowding.

Conclusion 3: Knowing the existence of quite successful methods (Chile), to manage, in a somewhat more orderly manner, the entry and exit of these funds to the country, the fact that nothing similar has been developed in Venezuela, It is another evidence of the government's apathy that punishes us.

Evidence 4: Economic decisions made by long-term investors, both foreign and domestic, take time to execute. For example, the decision to open a factory or to build a hotel or to plant a forest is not made overnight. On the contrary, swallow capitals react in seconds, via purchase and sale orders and electronic transfers. Its economic impact is, therefore, much more immediate and explosive.

Reflection 4: I believe that the most important economic signals for a country emanate from long-term actors, such as the hotelier from Cumaná, the rice farmer from Calabozo and the industrialist from Guacara. However, the urgency and immediacy represented by the pressures of the swallow capitals probably means that the latter manage to attract too much of the attention of the economic authorities.

Conclusion 4: As long as the economy (and politics) obeys, to a greater degree, the young man with gelled hair and suspenders who rules the short term, ignoring long-term signals, the path to economic disaster will remain clear of obstacles

Evidence 5: Venezuela has received an extraordinary amount of resources over the last 25 years, in the short and long term, and they have been of no use. Venezuela, in recent years, has received important long-term funds and they have not been of much use either.

Reflection 5: If we do not know how to manage the resources granted in the long term, what are we doing trying to attract short-term resources?

Conclusion 5: As long as a viable economic development model and a government system that inspires confidence have not been established, the country should not be interested in swallow capital at all, even if it has an efficient gatekeeper to regulate the entry and exit.

Evidence 6: “Credit rating” agencies, despite being used by many diverse actors, such as banking and insurance regulatory entities, with long-term interests, in reality, work mainly for bankers and investors who wish to take liquid positions at short term.

Reflection 6: For someone interested in the long term, for example, a young citizen, the opinions of a “credit rating” agency can be quite irrelevant. Also, know that not every expression of distrust produces bad results.

Consolation 1: Venezuela, in recent years, has not been subject to an invasion of swallow capital as large as it could have been. Imagine the chaos that would occur if some $20 billion of hot money had entered the country and today they were anxiously seeking its way out. The interest rates needed to contain such a herd would have to exceed four digits.

Consolation 2: Do you remember the story of the anguished debtor who finds sleep when with “I can't pay you” he transfers his insomnia to the banker? In our case, something similar happens. When the Venezuelan score goes down, personally, I sleep better, safe in the knowledge that they will not be giving so many resources, on behalf of myself, my daughters and future descendants, to governments that insist on wasting them.

Conclusion 6: The day our governments (during non-electoral times) pay more attention to the opinion of their humble subjects, instead of the opinion of the glamorous international agencies, that day we will have a greater chance of getting out of this situation of ours , which I can only classify and, forgive my English, as a “standard moody and poor”.

https://unsustainabledebtsustainability.blogspot.com/1998/10/about-bad-trust-and-good-distrust.html