Close to crying 'Yankee go Home'

I am a Venezuelan of European background and was born a few years after the end of World War II. I grew up under the influence of Audie Murphy movies and comic strips that extolled the valor and sacrifice of American soldiers in their efforts to save Europe from the clutches of fascism. As an adolescent, although against the Vietnam War, my little piece of American heart prevented me from participating in public protests outside the US Embassy, and even more so from flag burning.

However as I am nearing my fiftieth birthday, I suddenly have an incredible urge to yell “Yankee Go Home”. This occurred most recently when I read another of Rowan's articles, in this case blasting away at the latest changes implemented at PDVSA.

Theoretically, had we successfully arrived at the end of the opening of the oil industry, the recent cuts in production, which have had such positive effects over the last few months, would have been impossible to execute since the private sector would have to be compensated. The oil opening per se implied a departure, albeit clandestine, from OPEC. Since I have never been convinced that OPEC was losing relevance, I publicly opposed this oil opening policy, asking that its implications be democratically discussed.

I also considered that the Venezuelan oil industry benefited from being divided into several different entities. Even though this evidently represented additional costs, it was a good way of achieving mutual and cross supervision by experts in the industry. 

Therefore, when we were sold a restructuring based on supposed and overestimated savings (an annual figure of US$ 2 billion was brazenly bandied about) and which simply implied a total centralization of power, I loudly cried foul.

We were told that due to the lack of internal resources it was necessary to invite foreign capital to participate in the development of basic activities such as exploration and production.

Soon after, as if by magic, resources suddenly appeared tand were quickly invested in the “strategic” but very poorly explained building of gasoline stations that could also sell fast food. I felt misled and publicly informed PDVSA that the risk of Kuwait building a gas station in Las Mercedes in Caracas in order to compete directly and sell its ultra-light gasoline to the local market was really very slight.

I also protested, and continue to do so, when PDVSA, in the face of an upward trend in outsourcing of services, created the CIED in order to sell seminars and courses to captive clients. I protested and continue to protest when PDVSA, without much explanation, used an inmense amount of resources to finance studies of commercial ports in rivers in the eastern part of the country, for example.

The President of PDVSA should occupy his post as if he were a soldier on a battlefield on a sacred national mission. It wrenched my soul to see how he thinks he is a General Patton instead, and finds his way onto an entire page of the Wall Street Journal as Executive of the Year. Perhaps it should have been Entrepreneur of the Year.

Three years ago, as I traveled in the interior of the country, I observed how high interest rates, new taxes and a foreign exchange policy that in real terms strongly revalued the national currency were taking the country on a wild ride towards recession. 

At that point, while expressing my anguish at the possibility of a permanent loss of jobs, the then President of PDVSA, as if he were any common politician on TV, happily informed whoever would listen, that Venezuela was "condemned to success”. I almost cried with rage.

Last week, Rowan wrote that PDVSA’s ex-President, Luis Giusti, had produced a bonus of US$ 2.3 billion for the state with the oil opening - as if this were not simply the fruit of oil income perceived in advance, unfortunately already frittered away.

Rowan wrote: “Giusti’s strategy was brilliant. From a national perspective, Giusti was a patriot”. With respect to the recent changes at PDVSA, he wrote: “The development of this country has just been set back twenty years. The only institution in active transition to modernization, professionalism and meritocracy in Venezuela has been sacked. It’s been vandalized, ruined by ideologues from a Dark Age”.

I recently registered a NGO called Petropolitan, and through it I am fighting against the taxes on oil products imposed by a majority of the oil consuming countries of the world. These charges prevent oil-producing countries from receiving what they should rightly be receiving from the sale of their non-renewable resources.

The real value of an item of goods is normally measured at the consumer level, and in this sense the average value of a barrel of oil in the world might have already surpassed US$ 100. Of that value, up to a few months ago, the producer only received US$ 10, and today still has to settle for a meager US$ 20. I hope that someday when the absurd confiscation by taxmen in the developed world is eliminated, they will receive, say US$ 40 or more. If this defense of what is rightly ours classifies me in Rowan’s world as being one of the ideologues of the Dark Ages, then that is exactly what I am, and am proud of being so.

Daily Journal, Caracas, September 24, 1999

Petropolitan: http://petropolitan.blogspot.com/1999/09/close-to-crying-yankee-go-home.html

Treading deeper into red

As we all know by now, PDVSA has recently managed to successfully float a bond issue for US$ 1.8 billion in the international financial markets. Mr. Giusti, its President, as well as some external market analysts maintain that PDVSA’s asset base is immense while its debt load is relatively small. According to all of them, the company should be in a position to use more leverage.

As a Venezuelan citizen, father of three other Venezuelan citizens and therefore, at least in theory, a minority shareholder of PDVSA, I must admit that rarely have declarations by “people in the know” caused me so much anguish.

Venezuela used to be the target of the international financial community due to the existence of vast oil sector assets and reserves that ranked us among the wealthy nations of the world. This resulted in the contracting of loans that ultimately resulted in our overbearing external debt load. These resources have been poorly managed and have definitely not contributed to the well being of the country.

Should PDVSA now go out and contract debt and issue liens or mortgages on our petroleum assets without insuring that the resources obtained thereby are used to repay debt previously acquired, we are condemning the country to total ruin.

Evidently we all know about the fiscal bind we are in as a consequence of the fall in world oil prices. It is easy to argue in favor of new indebtedness as a transitory way of squaring our national accounts when the alternatives are 1) inflation as a result of fiscal deficits or 2) deepening recession due to an effort to balance the before-mentioned fiscal accounts.

What is not, and cannot, be permissible is to allow PDVSA to take over roles corresponding specifically to the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. The nation also cannot allow the evasion, via PDVSA, of the few instruments still in place, which allow us to control national debt levels.

Until now, I figured there was a great national consensus about the need to keep PDVSA’s balance sheet basically free of liabilities. The evidence seemed to be there. To begin with, PDVSA’s current debt doesn’t reach US$ 4 billion. On top of this, the Oil Opening was justified on the basis of a lack of resources available in PDVSA for future expansion. Evidently, the company’s debt capacity was not taken into account then.

We can also clearly remember that during all the restructuring processes undertaken by Venezuela in the past and which finally resulted in the Brady Bond issues, any alternative which was to involve PDVSA’s assets in one way or another as a basis for the restructuring was rejected outright.

We feel that something seems to have changed. From one day to the next, we are told that an offshore company, PDV Finance, has been set up to facilitate the assignation of accounts receivable or to undertake factoring transactions. At the same time, we understand that Mr. Giusti has expressed his surprise at PDVSA’s capacity for leverage. This cannot possibly surprise anybody expect those that have never even contemplated it.

We remember that a few months back, when the Brady Bond swap came to light, we were witnesses to the debate related to the application of the Law of Public Credit. For a smaller amount, many protested the fact that Congress was not properly and directly consulted. Today’s silence, then, is outright baffling.

I sincerely hope, for the sake of my country, that things have really not changed radically and that someone has not decided to take the stick to the PDVSA piñata.

Some analysts have gone on record as saying that PDVSA qualifies for loans at lower interest rates, and that the country therefore has a good deal going. I remind these analysts, however, that the true final cost of any debt transaction depends on what the resources are actually used for. In this sense, our governments have been masters at converting even the most generous loans into expensive ones through sheer wastefulness.

I remind those that console themselves with the fact that the resources made available by this new debt are aimed exclusively at covering PDVSA internal requirements how fungible these resources really are. For example, the US$ 2 billion raised by the oil opening, which should theoretically have been applied towards PDVSA’s investment program, were really spent on our central “dis-administration’s” unproductive payrolls. If this permeability becomes a habit, we are merely allowing them to dig all of us deeper into the hole.

Therefore, as a Venezuelan, I also remind Mr. Giusti and his other co-Directors that their function is to be the custodians of Venezuela’s riches. Their function is not to raise the specter of generous credit lines and basically act as a croupier or as a Maecenas to the government of turn.

The Petroleum Ombudsman revisited

Almost one year ago, I published an articled titled “The Petroleum Ombudsman”. In this article I raised the need to institutionalize the figure of a qualified entity that could satisfy the requirements of the Venezuelan citizens of objective and independent information and analysis related to the country’s oil industry.

At that time, my observations were initially driven by a desire to know what effects on the industry the vast restructuring of PDVSA’s organization would have. In my opinion, there was a risk of centralization of the company.

Today, upon reviewing the myriad of questions PDVSA’s actions have raised in the Venezuelan society over the past year, I am even more convinced that the matter of the ombudsman for the petroluem sector must pass from being a mere suggestion to being an outright and urgent requirement. Let us see some examples:

The Oil Opening was justified by a lack of availability of resources to continue PDVSA’s investment plans. All of the funds raised by the opening, however, went directly into the Nation’s fiscal coffers. Who can explain that?

Without the slightest remorse, the National Executive requested that PDVSA withhold or delay payment of its obligations to local suppliers in an effort to further fight inflationary pressures, thereby becoming just another poor payer. Could this have been the beginning of an interesting swap aimed at sending Mr. Guisti to the Central Bank in return for Dr. Casas?

We are continually bombarded by adds in the press, selling courses and seminars to be dictated by an educational affiliate denominated PDVSA Cied. One single session, from 8 AM to 5 PM costs Bs. 300,000, an evident divorce from the economic realities of the country. When was PDVSA authorized by the country to expand its scope of activities in this manner?

Everyone has been made aware of the dangers of lead in gasoline. The solution for this seems to be of lesser importance than the revamping of an immense amount of service stations which, in addition to dispensing gasoline, are also to sell snacks. Who establishes investment priorities?

If any market is to be considered a captive client for PDVSA, it should be the Venezuelan one. I find it difficult to visualize a supertanker from the gulf trying to pass gasoline through our port authorities with the aim of selling me the concept “Put a camel in your tank”. If this is so, and if PDVSA truly is short of resources, on what basis can they announce a plan to invest US$ 800 million over the next nine years in order to improve their service station network. Why aren’t these resources invested in countries who’s markets we should be conquering?

And while we are talking of PDV, how much did the changes in image and the marketing of a new logo and trademark cost us?

And speaking of logos and trademarks, I haven’t seen any of the large oil companies now coming into Venezuela to participate in the local markets make these changes in order to compete in our environment. In a world of global markets, global coherence would seem to be important. We are all aware of the PDVSA’s important participation in the US markets through its holdings in the CITGO network. Why, then, don’t we support this trademark and market it in Venezuela as well?

By raising these questions, I don’t wish to give the impression that I argue in favor of the Petroleum Ombudsman only to supervise PDVSA. It is also important to note that this office could also launch a vigorous defense of the industry’s interests at times when fiscal pressures are brought to bear by the National Executive. These pressures could ultimately lead to further indebtedness and/or endanger our goose of the golden eggs in many other ways.

If anyone still harbors doubts as to the need for the office of this ombudsman, it should be enough to reflect on the confusion and ado created by the question as to whether PDVSA has or has not legally complied with is fiscal obligations.

PDVSA is a State owned company, headed by Directors and Management designated by the State. We should therefore be able to expect a certain confidence an adherence by the same with the norms handed down by the State. If this were not so, it would seem to indicate a much more serious problem, one that cannot be solved merely by establishing a special SENIAT office within PDVSA.