Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz should be ashamed of himself for arguing racial profiling was a major cause of the 2007/08 subprime mortgage crisis

Nobel Prize winner Joseph E. Stiglitz, in “When Shall We Overcome?” Project Syndicate, March 12, 2018 writes: “America’s financial sector targeted African-Americans for exploitation, especially in the years before the financial crisis, selling them volatile products with high fees that could, and did, explode.” Thousands lost their homes, and in the end, the disparity in wealth, already large, increased even more. One leading bank, Wells Fargo, paid huge fines for charging higher interest rates to African-American and Latino borrowers”

No! America’s financial sector did not target any special community”. It targeted extraordinary returns on equity made possible by the process of securitization teaming up with extremely lousy bank regulations.

1. A part of the financial sector targeted originating and packaging very lousy high interest rate mortgages into AAA rated securities, because that is how you make real big money in the process of securitizing. Packaging an AA rated mortgage into an AAA rated security is not even worth the effort. Packaging a $300.000, 30 year, 11% fixed rate mortgage, and getting an AAA rating on the resulting security, that would allow you to perhaps sell the mortgage as if 6% was a reasonable rate, something which would allow the team to pocket $210.000 in immediate profits.

2. In 2004, bank regulators approved that if those securities had an AAA rating, or if an AAA rated corporation (AIG) had sold a default guarantee on such securities even if it had worse credit ratings, then banks needed to hold only 1.6% in capital, meaning they could leverage 62.5 times with it. If banks thought they could only make 1% in net margin on those securities, then they could expect 62.5% yearly return on equity… and frankly who could resist such a temptation.

Put those two things together and you have 99% of the explanation you need without having to enter into any sort of racial profiling arguments.

Professor Stiglitz having served in 2009 as the chairman of the U.N. Commission on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, where he oversaw suggested proposals and commissioned a report on reforming the international monetary and financial system, should know all that very well, and so he should be ashamed of himself for doing so.

Let us rescue Caveat Emptor!

The implied warranty of fitness given to us by the credit rating agencies has not served us well, especially when the issuers of the warranties now inform us that they give us their opinions under the protection of the First Amendment, and that they cannot therefore be held responsible for their opinions.

It is obviously high time to rescue the Caveat Emptor principles in financial regulations, though in fact it seems that the market has been doing so on its own lately.

Let us never forget that the current crisis did not result from the market investing in badly awarded mortgage loans to what is known as the subprime sector but from investing securities collateralized with such mortgages and that received a prime rating.

Inclusive financial systems, though generally good, could also be dangerous for the poor

If you have to pay a higher interest rate than what the average borrower pays, you should be extra careful with what you borrow for, as this could otherwise set you back even more.

For instance, if you want to buy a house that has a market value of $100.000 and have the $12.000 for a down-payment, you need a credit for the balance of $88.000. Let’s suppose that you could for that purpose access a 15 years fixed rate mortgage but, because you are considered a subprime risk, your lender requires a very high interest rate of 11 percent, which would require you to pay 1.000 dollars per month.

Had you qualified as a good risk and therefore could have access to for instance a rate of only 6 percent, then your $1.000 monthly sacrifice for the next 15 years would, in present value terms, be worth $118.500. From this we can deduct that if you bought your house under current conditions, at 11 percent, and did not wait until you could access to a 6 percent rate, then you will in fact have paid $130.500 for the house ($12.000+$118.500).

This is a sad truth often forgotten. Of course broad-based and inclusive financial systems can significantly aid financial development, reduce poverty, and expand economic opportunity in developing countries… but sometimes their embrace can also be a bit too rough for many of the poor.

Every time anyone pays a rate higher than the risk-free rate in order to purchase goods or services he is in fact accepting paying a higher price for these and which is of course not the surest way to get out from poverty. If anyone needs to be made aware of this it is the poor in the world.

Many subprime mortgage borrowers in the US are currently suffering from too much inclusiveness and will be made poorer as a result. They harbor no doubts on that they would have been much better of had they been excluded, and there are important lessons to be learned from that.

The World Bank, CGAP and other who share the mission of fighting poverty, after so many years of focusing almost exclusively on the access to finance and the stability of the financial system, need to pause, take a breather, and completely rebalance their approach to these issues.

As a bare minimum we need real proof that these programs have indeed reduced poverty in a sustainable way and not just opened up new opportunities for financiers. As a bare minimum “Financial education of the poor” needs to appear among the strategic priorities…currently it does not!

This has not only to do about guaranteeing that the interest rates are reasonable but also with the fact that even taking on debt at reasonable rates might be extremely unreasonable.

Personally I feel there are too many bankers and too few debtors (perhaps none) included in the above programs, and that is a guaranteed way to introduce bias.

We must allow our banks to be banks again

Our commercial banks besides being able to repay our deposits are supposed to help generate the economic growth that creates decent jobs and to distribute the opportunities in the society to those most able…otherwise a mattress would suffice.

Bank regulators, through the Basel Accord, 1988, and all the ensuing regulations, created a methodology for calculating the minimum capital requirements of the banks that was exclusively based on the perceived risk of default in their lending operations. And they followed it up by appointing the credit rating agencies as their commissars or official risk perceivers.

The above immediately created a world of opportunities and perhaps even needs for regulatory arbitrage and which has now degenerated in the current state of general and absolute incomprehension about what is going on.

The promised risk elimination has just turned out to be the hiding and the dangerous accumulation of risks. In my country whenever there is a tremor everyone applauds as these help keep the big earthquakes away, but Basel is only managing to keep the tremors away.

To further evidence the current confused state of affairs in developing countries we see how the banks finance more and more the public sector and securitized consumers instead of entrepreneurs; and in develop countries we frequently find more courses that analyze how credit rating agencies might change their opinions about a firm than courses about how to analyze the finances of a firm.

Now if we are ever going to have a chance of getting out of this mother of all the financial imbroglios there cannot be much doubt that we urgently need to start doing some back tracking on our current bank regulations… and allow our banks to be banks again.

There are risks in shying away from risks

Friends and development experts, would you please comment on the following

When the Bank Committee of Basel decided on the minimum capital requirements methodology they loaded up new expenses on the credits already more expensive because they were perceived to be of higher risks and this resulted in the introduction of a regulatory bias against risk taking in the commercial banking sector.

It is indeed sad when a developed nation decides making risk-adverseness the primary goal of their banking system and shies away from risks and places itself voluntarily on a downward slope, but it is a real tragedy when developing countries copycats them and also fall into the trap of calling it quits.

More from this perspective on http://www.subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/

There is a dangerous regulatory arbitrated run towards safety

Credits which are perceived as having a lower risk than others have a natural market advantage that translates into lower interest rates. But the bank regulations that have been developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, by applying minimum capital requirements based on the risks perceived by the credit rating agencies, have added through their regulatory arbitration an additional and artificial benefit that biases the market in favor of "low-risk" credits.

The above is producing a run towards either a more objectively "safe portfolio" or providing further stimulus for "risk-hiding". Since the largest needs for development do not ordinary make a living in the land of the low risks it is clear that development finance is the largest victim from this run and we could even say that the development power of the commercial banks in developing countries has as a result been severely diminished.

But also developed countries will pay for this, not only as already evidenced by the subprime-mortgage mess, but also since no society can survive as viable maximizing risk avoidance. As I see it our future generations will pay dearly for this baby-boomers invented run to safety.