Five tweets and four PS: When shares and houses will want or need to transition from here to there, what will happen?

Huge QE, large fiscal deficits, and generous bank credit pushed on by very low capital requirements, injected huge amounts of liquidity that, among others, caused the price of shares, and the price of houses that morphed from homes into investment assets, to increase immensely.

Soon many of the elderly owners of shares and houses, will want to reconvert these assets again into main-street purchase capacity, whether voluntarily, in order to cover for their retirement costs, or involuntary, by having these assets becoming part of an inheritance.

The sale of shares and houses will then face: An extremely indebted economy that includes huge unfunded social obligations. Gig jobs, robots that tend to hold down wages, and pension funds and insurance companies also needing to sell assets in order to meet their own commitments.

How is all that going to play out? Since there are no possibilities of reenacting Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), or placing all shares and houses on central bank’s balances, it has me very troubled and finding very little that could bring me, a grandfather, some relief.

Is someone somewhere preparing financial or economic counter measures that could alleviate the problems brewing in the horizon? I really doubt it! As Einstein said, “We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”

PS. All this could be further much complicated by social tensions caused by lack of employment. Therefore I would ignore all the redistribution profiteers’ natural objections, and immediately enact an Unconditional Universal Basic Income. Even $100 per month would do for a start.

PS. That UBI could be partially funded by a high tax on carbon emissions. That would allow us to use market signaling more, in order to avoid that whatever little resources we might have available for fighting climate change, are captured by green-profiteers.

PS. Bank regulators messed it up for us. Their risk-weighted capital requirements only guarantee banks building up especially large exposures, to what’s perceived as especially safe, against especially little capital, dooming bank systems to especially large crises

PS. If our descendants are to stand a chance they must understand that risk-taking is the oxygen of any development, and so they must be wary of any loony runaway risk aversion, imposed by expert besserwisser nannies. God make us daring!

Fiscal waste's decades out

Some want tax cuts.

Some wants tax increases

But no one want tax spending cuts

So its the fiscal waste's decades out

But why worry when it is so easy to finance it with QEs, low interest rates and regulatory subsidies.

Regulatory subsidies? 

1988, Basel I's risk weighted bank capital requirements that decree 0% risk-weight for sovereigns and 100% entrepreneurs. 

Who picks what is cut by "Sequestration 2013"?

Huffington Post sent me an amazing list of cuts in Maryland that “Sequestration 2013” would bring. Who picks some of these utterly dumb cuts? Is there not something more worthy of the ax?

Can the mighty US really crumble into pieces because of an $85bn lowering of its budgeted growing fiscal expenses? It could be, because from what I read everywhere, they seem to be intent to cut many of the last things that should be cut.

Of bolivars and time-sharing

The oft-mentioned Law for the Safeguarding of Public Patrimony (Ley de Salvaguarda del Patrimonio Público) imposes controls over the sale or liquidation of public assets. 

It is interesting to note that this law is completely and utterly ignored when it comes to the sale, day after day, hour after hour, of what should be classified as the country’s main public assets, i.e. its reserve of dollars.

At this point in time, I doubt there is one economist that, upon having analyzed the evolution of relative prices and the forecasts for the country’s income levels (basically oil), doesn’t consider that the Bolívar is overvalued to the tune of at least 20%. That means the Dollar should be worth at least Bs. 670.

Why, then, don’t we devalue? I don’t know the proper answer for this question, but if you asked me to speculate, I would probably infer that it was due to factors such as ignorance or stubbornness. 

I still remember back in 1982, when I called for a modest devaluation of the Bolivar so as to correctly reflect circumstances that resemble the ones we have present today. The absurd argument against this devaluation I received from professionals of fame and reputation was that this was impossible since we were due to celebrate the bicentennial of our Liberator Simon Bolivar in 1983, and that a devaluation was tantamount to denigrating the latter.

These references to the dishonor of Bolivar’s memory, were totally confusing for someone like myself. I was educated under the influence of a system of competitive economies for whom the real heroes were those authorities that managed to devalue the currencies of their countries just a tad more that their neighbors, furthering economic development even if this came at the expense of others. I consider it is patriotic to generate opportunities of internal employment by way of increasing exports and minimizing imports. 

It is possible that we still have public servants that equate a downwards readjustment of the exchange rate with national weakness and an upwards readjustment with strength. If these people have invested a high amount of ego in this argument, God save us if they find that they could theoretically return to the days of Bs. 4.30/US$ by increasing bank reserve requirements and increasing interest rates.

One of the more ridiculous arguments arising from this debate is that the government is not promoting a fiscally motivated devaluation thereby showing that there is great seriousness in the managing of the country’s finances. Devaluations are the consequence of irresponsible fiscal management, not the cause of it.

The only truly fiscally motivated devaluation that occurs is when, due to a lack of confidence in the future of the country, the market decides to pay an exaggerated premium for foreign currency. We could call this a tax on nervousness. 

When we analyze recent Venezuelan history, there is no doubt that our governments have been very efficient in their collection of this tax. “The budget doesn’t balance. Let’s spook the markets and get more Bolivars for every Dollar”.

The least we should expect out of a government in its dying days is that they don’t leave a wide gap in the valuation of our currency based exclusively on artifices such as disproportionately high interest rates or the simple burning of international reserves.

The next government’s job, whoever it is, will be sufficiently complicated without having to tackle this type of problem.

The use of mini-devaluations fixed within a band is a reasonable policy when one is trying to manage market expectations on inflation and devaluation into the future. The use of the band system and mini-devaluations to hide facts that already exist (inflation and falling oil prices) is an insult to our country and our intelligence.

If, in the face of all of its mistakes, the Government really wishes to make an act of penitence, I suggest they go about seriously and effectively reducing the unproductive public payroll. I say seriously and effectively since our governors have in the past demonstrated their dexterity in applying the techniques used by the sales persons hawking time-sharing units.

These sales persons normally increase the sales price by US$ 15,000 in order to then generously award potential purchasers a discount of US$ 12,000. The same goes for our politicians, who first increase the public payroll in order to then propose a reduction.

By the way, it is being said that, although the government has not been able to reduce the payroll, it has at least designed the restructuring plans that will allow the next government to achieve this goal “with ease”. 

I believe that, as far as shamelessness is concerned, our politicians are head and shoulders above sellers of time-sharing units.