Standards and quality rating agencies for Knowledge Networks

How to guarantee the good quality of knowledge networks? was a question posed in the recent Mobilizing Knowledge Networks for Development at the World Bank.

At our table we conversed about the need for a Quality Standard, a sort of an ISO 9000, so that each participant was able to better identify what knowledge network he was getting involved with, so as not to lose his valuable time and efforts, or end up unwillingly exploited.

We also conversed about the possibility of having knowledge-network-quality rating agencies, rate the networks, initially based on some few but important variables, like the following:

Clarity of purpose

Clarity of rules of engagement

How it complies with the above (A network Ombudsman?)

True diversity (and respect for differing opinions)

If there is an interest out there in this community to further the discussions on this issue, at least I would be glad to participate, but someone else would have to manage that process, since because of other engagements I would not be able to get a good quality rating doing so.

perkurowski@gmail.com     

The telecom ombudsman

As we rapidly approach the next millennium, there is no doubt that the Internet world with all its communication, information and commerce facets, will most surely evolve into one of the most important elements in the development of any country. The way we can take advantage of it will depend on how it is commercially regulated.

In Venezuela we are at a crossroads. Either we allow access to the Internet to be the main business, to the benefit of the telecommunication companies and the national government who ultimately issues the corresponding concessions, or we allow the users, our children and future entrepreneurs to capitalize on the opportunities by way of free and cheap access.

Recent efforts at privatization seem to not have favored the end users of the services. 

CANTV was sold on the basis that it generated high income for the Nation and expectations of high returns for the investors. Evidently, the only outcome of this equation are high tariffs. Likewise, Margarita knows more than well that the price to be paid for success in the sale of its power sector is just that, high tariffs.

The State, due to conflicts of interests, frequently cannot adequately manage its role as representative or defender of the public’s rights, as in this case, those of the end users. It is precisely because of this that all around the world, the figure of the Ombudsman becomes important. 

The Ombudsman is an independent, capable and responsible person. Adequately provided with the resources necessary to fulfill his role, he dedicates his time to the users interest.

One prime example of this is the TIO in Australia. Its initials come from the words Telecommunications, Industry and Ombudsman and it is an independent entity established in 1993 to help solve disputes between the telecommunications companies and the small users both residential and commercial. As of 1997 it has also been entrusted the processing of complaints about Internet services.

TIO’s service is free, but it only intervenes after the user has initially tried to solve its disputes directly with the purveyor of the service. It’s authority includes the investigation of matters relative to billing, service cuts, mobile service, access to the Internet, privacy, operator and directory assistance, public phones and basic telephone service.

Today TIO processes about 1,200 complaints per week. Approximately 95% of these cases are solved within 48 hours and only 0.05% of these end up in court. As do most arbitrage processes, the TIO does not analyze cases from a strictly legalistic viewpoint but rather on the base of merit and reasonability.

The costs incurred by TIO are covered by all of the telecommunications companies depending on the number of complaints raised against them.

In spite of all this success, however, and to the detriment of all Australian users, aspects related to tariffs are unfortunately out of TIO’s jurisdiction. 

I am convinced that in order to truly comply with his role of defender of the rights of the users of public services, the Ombudsman must be involved in the process of establishment of tariffs. Evidently, this role in tariff fixation must be based on reasonability, and not on the blocking of tariff increases which are necessary in order to continue to guarantee an adequate service.

How wonderful it would be to see the incorporation of the figure of the Ombudsman of Telecommunications to help with our own privatization efforts. He could most certainly help insure that the awarding of concessions does not result in a penalty for future users. 

Likewise, his support of the inclusion of norms and regulations in the concession agreements that would guarantee a good level of service as of day one would save us a lot of the grief we are shouldering today.

An Ombudsman would be most welcome in what has up to now been a negotiated process strictly between telecommunications companies and the nation. If the players do not accept this, we should require it of the Constituent Assembly.

In closing, I remind the users of cellular phone services in Venezuela, that tariffs in Israel, for example, are 10 times lower than theirs. The explanation? In Israel, the concessions were awarded to those operators who offered to install the most lines and the lowest tariffs. In Venezuela the concessions are awarded to those that offer the best deal for the taxman.

The Petroleum Ombudsman revisited

Almost one year ago, I published an articled titled “The Petroleum Ombudsman”. In this article I raised the need to institutionalize the figure of a qualified entity that could satisfy the requirements of the Venezuelan citizens of objective and independent information and analysis related to the country’s oil industry.

At that time, my observations were initially driven by a desire to know what effects on the industry the vast restructuring of PDVSA’s organization would have. In my opinion, there was a risk of centralization of the company.

Today, upon reviewing the myriad of questions PDVSA’s actions have raised in the Venezuelan society over the past year, I am even more convinced that the matter of the ombudsman for the petroluem sector must pass from being a mere suggestion to being an outright and urgent requirement. Let us see some examples:

The Oil Opening was justified by a lack of availability of resources to continue PDVSA’s investment plans. All of the funds raised by the opening, however, went directly into the Nation’s fiscal coffers. Who can explain that?

Without the slightest remorse, the National Executive requested that PDVSA withhold or delay payment of its obligations to local suppliers in an effort to further fight inflationary pressures, thereby becoming just another poor payer. Could this have been the beginning of an interesting swap aimed at sending Mr. Guisti to the Central Bank in return for Dr. Casas?

We are continually bombarded by adds in the press, selling courses and seminars to be dictated by an educational affiliate denominated PDVSA Cied. One single session, from 8 AM to 5 PM costs Bs. 300,000, an evident divorce from the economic realities of the country. When was PDVSA authorized by the country to expand its scope of activities in this manner?

Everyone has been made aware of the dangers of lead in gasoline. The solution for this seems to be of lesser importance than the revamping of an immense amount of service stations which, in addition to dispensing gasoline, are also to sell snacks. Who establishes investment priorities?

If any market is to be considered a captive client for PDVSA, it should be the Venezuelan one. I find it difficult to visualize a supertanker from the gulf trying to pass gasoline through our port authorities with the aim of selling me the concept “Put a camel in your tank”. If this is so, and if PDVSA truly is short of resources, on what basis can they announce a plan to invest US$ 800 million over the next nine years in order to improve their service station network. Why aren’t these resources invested in countries who’s markets we should be conquering?

And while we are talking of PDV, how much did the changes in image and the marketing of a new logo and trademark cost us?

And speaking of logos and trademarks, I haven’t seen any of the large oil companies now coming into Venezuela to participate in the local markets make these changes in order to compete in our environment. In a world of global markets, global coherence would seem to be important. We are all aware of the PDVSA’s important participation in the US markets through its holdings in the CITGO network. Why, then, don’t we support this trademark and market it in Venezuela as well?

By raising these questions, I don’t wish to give the impression that I argue in favor of the Petroleum Ombudsman only to supervise PDVSA. It is also important to note that this office could also launch a vigorous defense of the industry’s interests at times when fiscal pressures are brought to bear by the National Executive. These pressures could ultimately lead to further indebtedness and/or endanger our goose of the golden eggs in many other ways.

If anyone still harbors doubts as to the need for the office of this ombudsman, it should be enough to reflect on the confusion and ado created by the question as to whether PDVSA has or has not legally complied with is fiscal obligations.

PDVSA is a State owned company, headed by Directors and Management designated by the State. We should therefore be able to expect a certain confidence an adherence by the same with the norms handed down by the State. If this were not so, it would seem to indicate a much more serious problem, one that cannot be solved merely by establishing a special SENIAT office within PDVSA.

PDVSA’s shadow budget

Once again we read that PDVSA has been given instructions to purchase goods and services it requires to operate from sources outside national borders, limiting thereby local purchases. The reason for this policy is purported to be the fight against inflationary pressures. Although we have continuously heard declarations issued by Government sources to this effect, the official petroleum sector vehemently denies it.

Evidently, it did not take long for local suppliers of goods and services to raise the roof with severe criticism. The latter is obviously based on the outright injustice brought on them and the local economy by an evident preference given foreign suppliers. The brief observations that follow address other aspects of this initiative.

Above all, it is important to note that there is no direct link between local purchases and inflation, specially in the case of PDVSA. Should the oil industry purchase goods locally instead of importing them, the State always has the option of selling hard currency against Bolívares, thereby soaking up the possible excess liquidity caused by these transactions. By the way, in order not to be disqualified from the roster of possible suppliers of services to the oil industry, I am willing to invoice any services they could possibly require in US$ and from the location they prefer. The only thing left for me then is to make my peace with the tax man.

Evidently, it is necessary to import should PDVSA’s demand of local goods and services eventually result in such strain on supplies that prices go through the roof. In this case, imports would not be the result of the application of economic policy (hare-brained or not) but of a simple and usual business common sense that dictates that you buy where it is least expensive.

These observations bring us around to the real question about the real scope of the oil industry’s operative independence or, if we look at the other side of the coin, the scope of the direct influence exerted by the National Executive on PDVSA and its operations.

If it is true that the Government has the power to instruct PDVSA to direct it’s purchases towards one source or another, when to pay its bills, etc., etc., without being subjected to legal norms and regulations such as the Law of Safeguarding of Public Patrimony (Ley de Salvaguarda del Patrimonio Público) and running circles around the Central Bank’s independence without so much as a polite salute, then I’m afraid we are in the presence of a parallel government of some import.

I am not a public servant, but I feel that should I be one and be appointed to sit on the Finance Committee of Congress, I would definitely consider my job belittled. Should I be called on to collaborate with the development of the national budget, which is evidently based on the use of a few small printed bills, it is possible that the game of Monopoly would have immediately come to mind. In addition, I would surely be intensely jealous of those who, being directly in charge of budgeting the use of real resources such as PDVSA’s, have much more to say in the future of our country.

By saying this, I am not inferring that Congress should be the entity in charge of PDVSA’s budget. A democracy is based on the existence of a system of checks and balances. Therefore, if the National Executive, with or without reason, insists on intervening directly in the oil industry’s activities, it is clear that it is necessary to regulate the limits of this interference.

A few months ago for similar ends, I suggested the creation of the figure of the “Oil Ombudsman”. Initially this was aimed at simply informing the common citizen, objectively and truthfully, about the state of the national oil industry. In Swedish, the word “Ombudsman” means something like the spokesman and representative of public interest. It is a figure used in many countries in areas that are infinitely less important than the oil industry is to Venezuela.

Today, we are all trying to evaluate the consequences of the recent reorganization of PDVSA and would all like to clear up the issue of the instructions supposedly issued as far as PDVSA’s purchases are concerned. We all must feel the need to go talk to someone credible who could clearly answer our questions about matters related to the efficiency of the industry as well as about possible consequences of Government intervention in the same. If accusations of intervention are false, would it not be comforting to hear this from a neutral source as well?

It is probable that neither the National Executive nor the petroleum industry is keen about the possibility of having an external observer hanging around the halls. However, due to the all-important nature of the oil industry for Venezuela as a whole, it is our responsibility to request the existence of one.