The solutions I offer are ignored. Might it be because these provide too little business to expertize and redistribution profiteers?

Before the 2007-08 crisis there was some economic growth resulting from a big expansion of credit, which was fed by some very low capital requirements to banks and that allowed these to, in some cases, leverage their equity over 50 to 1.

Then disaster struck, as a consequence of excessive exposures to what had very little capital requirements, like loans to sovereigns (Greece), investments in AAA rated securities and the financing of houses. 

In panic, floods of money, for instance by means of QEs, were poured over the economies, with little results to show for it, and now, the most important world economies, are stuck. Any additional stimuli, be it by means of public borrowing for infrastructure projects, QEs or low or negative interest rates will only complicate matters much more... like for pension plans.

The truth is that trying to get strong and sustainable economic growth, while keeping in place credit risk-adverse capital requirements for banks that exclude SMEs and entrepreneurs from fair access to bank credit, is just impossible.

What to do?

1. Very carefully remove the risk-weighted capital requirements for banks that distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. In order to make sure banks have sufficient capital while adapting, and that credit is not constrained, central banks could offer to purchase some of their bad portfolios, with the understanding that no dividends would be paid until these portfolios had been repurchased by the banks. (See what Chile did)

2. Create new demand (and lessen inequalities), by means of 100% tax-funded Universal Basic Income schemes. One of these could, if funded with carbon taxes, also help with environmental sustainability.

I have been arguing against the risk weighted capital requirements for banks for soon two decades, and I have explained many of its mistakes over and over again. I have yet not been able to obtain one single answer from those responsible, like from the Basel Committee or the Financial Stability Board. Could it be because they have no answers? 

Or could it be that my counter proposals are too straightforward, to simple, and would therefore erode the earnings potential of bank regulators (and consultants), of climate change and inequality fighters, and of the general expertize and redistribution profiteers?

Or is it that I just don’t know what I am talking about? It could be, though I think I can prove I do know by means of somecertifiable early opinions on these issues.

The mouse that roared

This is dedicated to all of those who consider that the only way to combat the actual lack of self esteem present today in the country is to reduce it even further.

Last week, columnist Michael Rowan issued several recommendations for Venezuela, among these that you should “Ask not how you can be protected from the world. Ask only how best you can live in it”. 

I have frequently asked myself this question, but since the response that begins to develop in my mind is vastly different from the text book type answer hinted at by Mr. Rowan, I wish to make note of some of these differences.

To begin with, and even though I agree that a lot of the country’s internal problems as mentioned by Mr. Rowan really do exist, I consider it to be wrong to label Venezuela as a protectionist country. 

It could be that he did not know the Venezuela of old, but as of 1989 the country has, not always in a straight line and more often than not out of necessity rather than conviction, been submerged in a process of commercial and cultural aperture of such import that it is today one of the least protectionist countries in the world.

Upon rereading some of the articles I have written over the years, I find clear evidence of the fact that I have always been a constant defender of the markets as prime regulators and motors of the economy and as a consequence of this, I have also always been totally against what is today know as protectionism. 

In this sense, I am worried that Venezuela’s opening has not produced the desired results.

The commercial recipes common in today’s world are comprised primarily of the following two commandments: 

1) Open your borders and allow the products, services and capital offered by the rest of the world to come in so that all of your citizens may have access to the best the world can offer, produced in the most efficient manner possible; 

2) Respect the rights to intellectual property and to brands and patents in order to insure the adequate return of costs and to allow those who today fuel development to continue their mission.

In exchange for compliance with these commandments, the interested party is offered a first class ticket on the Train of Sustained Development on the way to a better economic future. 

Certainly, some of the passengers will be weaker than others. However, if all follow the same basic diet and exercise plan, based on the exploitation of inherent strengths with the adoption of an effort towards specialization, sooner or later, so goes the theory, all will be more or less equal.

Chile, for example, is a good example of what excellent results a ride on this Train can produce. Unfortunately, Venezuela, while having complied with the commandments almost religiously has absolutely nothing to show in the way of favorable results. Why? 

Rowan would answer, ‘It is Venezuela’s own fault’. I would say that while he is partially right, it is also important to say that the world is not playing a fair ball game.

The indisputable fact is that the world is applying duties on products derived from oil, as is the case of taxes on gasoline that in some parts of the world top 800% and that bar the producers from receiving his fair share of the sale of their resources. 

If these taxes were eliminated or were simply limited, for example, to something like the 26% duty imposed by Venezuela on the importation, Venezuela’s income would be much greater. Easily US$ 10 billion greater!

In this sense, if I am to respond to Mr. Rowan’s questions as to “How best you can live in it (the world)”, I would not be lying if I told you that I am feeling dangerously close to suggesting that we quit being stupid and that until the world comes around and gives us a fair shake by eliminating the damaging taxes on oil, we begin to behave as rogues.

As a first measure, it would be most tempting to raise all import duties to the same levels each country applies to oil. To follow up I could suggest we violate all brands and intellectual property rights, copy all medicines and facilitate their generic sale world wide. Finally, I would ask PDV to quit building fancy gasoline stations in Venezuela which, being sure that Kuwait is not waiting in the wings to compete on our turf, do not generate the sale of even one extra liter of gasoline. 

Instead I would construct large floating gasoline stations, anchor them off the coast of Europe and offer each European entrepreneur with a neoliberal bend the right to freely commercialize our gasoline tax free.

Am I exaggerating? One of the principal elements of discussion in the universe of ecological taxes, the ecotax, is how to insure that oil producing nations are also convinced to adopt fiscal policies involving high oil or energy taxes. 

The reason for this, in layman’s terms, is that if we don’t, industries that consume large amounts of energy could conceivably move to those countries with cheap energy, causing the loss of jobs in non-oil producing countries. So much for the specialization credo.

We should declare total and absolute war on the injustices of today’s system of commercial interchange. Just like the small country that declared war on Europe in the movie The Mouse That Roared, we have absolutely nothing to lose and much to gain. With so many enemies without why do we need to have enemies within?

Roping in the herd

We have frequently seen examples of how economies that permit total liberty for foreign investment flows, especially those that are in essence short-term investments, often must confront more difficulties than those that impose certain restrictions.

As so many things in life do, problems often have their roots in exaggeration. It is possible that on the one hand confidence and the magnitudes of the resulting flows become so great that they can actually hide problems or diminish the pressure brought to bear on local authorities to take corrective measures. On the other hand, absolute mass panic may set in, creating the medium for the type of accidents normally attributed to such a response (for example, the Mexican debacle and resulting “Tequila Effect”).

Since it is very difficult in most cases to identify a special event such as war, earthquakes, or the sudden death of an important leader as the trigger for a change in sentiment, and as we supposedly live in a world of virtual and perfect information, what could be the possible origin of the overly exaggerated reactions of fund managers?

Above all, I suspect that the financial roller-coaster rides we are subjected to have their origins in the traditional search for the type of security usually found in herds. This instinct predominates in most decision making. I refer specifically to the attitude “it doesn’t matter if things go well or not, as long as I’m in good company.”

As an example, I can go back to the period just after Venezuela abandoned exchange stability (February 1983). I watched with surprise as the treasurers of large multinational companies blithely signed contracts that insured future exchange rates at such incredible costs that they seemed outright irrational. The premium paid easily surpassed the possible exchange losses that would be caused by reasonably predictable devaluations.

When I tried to get to the bottom of this madness (frequently assisted in my investigation by offering a shot of whisky), I invariably would receive the following explanation: “We actually have two accounting registries. In the first we register the exchange earnings or losses per se. In the second we register the cost of the insurance premiums to cover exchange risks. Our head office has become so sensitive to exchange risk that it doesn’t combine both accounts to analyze the total net results. On the contrary, even if I save the company a fortune by not contracting this coverage, but incur in so much as one cent in exchange losses, I would be handed my pink slip in a flash.”

What, then, does this observation aim at? Simply that even when an individual or company is perfectly amicable, capable and basically worthy of an invitation to invest in our country, if his inclination as manager of funds is to follow the herd in stampede, the nation can simply not afford to allow him and his company to enter.

In this sense, we must ask why our monetary authorities have not managed to develop a coherent set of regulations to limit the inflow of international investment when this is obviously intended to be for irrationally short periods of time, in grossly large amounts, or both, instead of wasting time and money exchanging bonds and restructuring debt that matures in 20 years.

Countries like Chile, which have earned the confidence of international markets, limit the inflow of short-term investments. This limitation has definitely not resulted in damage. On the contrary, it has helped increase the confidence of exactly those foreign investors whom the country actually wishes to attract. They are not those that come on a 30-day visa, but rather those that come to invest for the long term.

It is important to remember that when a foreign investor risks his funds in a country in the long run, installing factories, developing projects, creating employment, and in general acquiring a real presence in the country, his interest in the future of the country becomes much more sincere and similar to that of the nation’s own population. Much more so than the interest of some fund manager sitting in New York or London.

When we speak of gaining the confidence of foreign investors, we must learn to discriminate among them.

PS. As you would want to know if those courting your daughters have serious intentions.

PS. 1998. Speaking about trust and distrust.

Published in Daily Journal, Caracas, December 4, 1997 and in "Voice and Noise" 2006.