Showing posts with label return on equity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label return on equity. Show all posts

Thursday, October 18, 2018

Investors want to promote the use of the products they have invested billions in; and that goes for cannabis-marijuana-marihuana-pot too.

My grandchildren are Canadian. 

So when I read in the Globe and Mail that “Investment banks reap rewards with $2.8-billion in cannabis equity deals” and the head of a Canadian bank’s Canadian equity capital-markets investments saying “Without cannabis new issue activity, our volumes would be down substantially more… it has certainly offset the declines in energy and power and utilities”, I really got nervous, mad, and began tweeting out everywhere.

"Is nobody concerned with those billions in equity invested in the legal production of cannabis-marijuana-marihuana-pot in Canada? That equity will search for good returns by promoting its intensive use. Have the pushers now moved to Wall Street?

I am not an absolutist against legalization of cannabis. I thought one of the best reasons for it was to fight the illegal business involved with its distribution… but what I now see seems more related to taking over that business L

Sunday, January 28, 2018

Many of our young will be without jobs, and will have to live in the basement of their parent’s houses, as a direct consequence of abominable bank regulations

Fact: The financing of house purchase is usually, with reason, perceived by bankers as much safer than financing entrepreneurs.

Fact: That means that, on their own, unregulated, banks would be expected to finance the purchase of houses more, and at lower risk adjusted interest rates, than financing entrepreneurs. 

Fact: But then bank regulators in 1988 doubled down on the same ex ante perceived risk and introduced risk weighted capital requirements. 

Fact: In those capital requirements (2004, Basel II) regulators assigned a much lower risk weight to the financing of houses (35%) than to the financing of entrepreneurs (100%).

This means regulators allow banks to hold less capital when financing the purchase of houses than when financing entrepreneurs. 

This means banks can now leverage their equity more when financing the purchase of houses than when financing entrepreneurs. 

This means banks can now obtain higher expected risk adjusted returns on equity when financing the purchase of houses than when financing entrepreneurs. 

This means that banks will even more prefer financing the purchase of houses, at even lower interest rates, than the financing of entrepreneurs.

This means easier, regulatory subsidized, access to house financing, causing higher house prices. How much of the easier  financing conditions when purchasing houses do we now have to finance when financing a house purchase?

This means a lesser, taxed by regulations, access to credit for entrepreneurs, causing less job creation and a slower growing real economy.

So, compared to what would be the case in the absence of these risk-weighted regulations this means:

For the young: Fewer possibilities of jobs and of buying their own houses. 

For house owners: They are sitting on assets that at current real valuations will not find buyers in the future.

For the aging: Lesser possibilities of taking care of their future needs.

For social peace: The young might revolt and shout: “Parents we’ve been cheated out of our future by crazy bank regulators, and you said nothing! So now you move down to the basements and we move upstairs!

PS. Those more interested in providing our young affordable housing than in helping our young to afford the houses, which is of course not the same thing, are as I see it just some other vulgar redistribution profiteers.

PS. Here a brief aide memoire on the major mistakes with the risk weighted capital requirements

Saturday, November 11, 2017

Who nudged regulators into using stupid and dangerous risk-weighted capital requirements for banks? The bankers?

Banks not capable of perceiving risks correctly, or not adjusting to perceived risks correctly, with size of exposure and adequate risk-premiums, should fail as fast as possible.

Banks capable of perceiving risks correctly, and to adjust to these correctly with size of exposure and adequate risk-premiums, would in fact not need to hold any capital.

Unfortunately, since banks could belong to the first group, and there is also the risk of unexpected events that could affect even the best of banks, regulators need to require banks to hold some capital.

Curiously, unfortunately, bank regulators, with the Basel Accord of 1988 introduced risk weighted capital requirements. These spelled out more risk more capital, less risk less capital. 

Though at first sight that might all sound quite logical, in terms of searching for more financial stability it makes no sense whatsoever, as what’s perceived as risky poses by just that fact alone less danger to the banks. It is what is perceived as safe than can cause banks to create excessive exposures, which if these later turn out risky could put a whole bank system in danger. 

To top it up it the risk weighting translates into allowing banks to leverage differently different assets, thereby producing different risk adjusted returns on equity than what would have been the case in the absence of this regulations, and so it introduced a serious distortion in the allocation of bank credit that is affecting the real economy.

Who could have nudged regulators to do so? Since being able to earn the highest risk adjusted returns on equity on what is perceived as safe sounds like a wet dream come true for bankers, I have my suspicions.

PS. Here an aide-mémoire on the principal mistakes of risk weighted capital requirements

Tuesday, October 10, 2017

If one were to construe a systemic risk that could bring bank systems down, this is one way

First: Make capital requirements for banks based on perceived risk. More risk more capital, less risk less capital. That would allow banks to leverage more with The Safe than with The Risky. That would allow banks to earn higher risk adjusted returns on equity lending to The Safe than when lending to The Risky.

Second: Allow banks to use their own risk models to decide what is risky and what is safe and therefore how much capital it needs. Alternatively allow some very few human fallible credit rating agencies to decide what is safe and what is risky.

Third: Sit down and wait for banks lending too much against too little capital to The Safe, like sovereigns, the AAArisktocracy and mortgages; within an economy weakened by too little lending to The Risky, like to SMEs and entrepreneurs.

But, oops, hold it there! Someone already did that! I think it was the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision.

Wednesday, August 31, 2016

My number umpteenth effort to explain to XXX the very bad of current bank regulations.

A “risky asset” yields more, let us say 15%.
A “safe asset” yields less, let us say 5%.

And those yields would be deemed by the market as equal risk adjusted yields.

And market participants would buy those assets according to their needs and risk appetites.

But then came the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision with its risk weighted capital requirements for banks, more risk more equity – less risk less equity, and that completely distorted the allocation of bank credit.

Because now banks could leverage their equity more with safe assets and thereby obtain higher risk adjusted returns on safe assets than with risky assets.

As a result the overall market demand for safe assets increased, and that of risky assets decreased. That “risky asset” yielding 15% before, might now have to yield 16% or more. That “safe asset” yielding 5% before, might now just yield 4% or less.

Is this good? Of course not! Regulators, probably without even understanding what they were doing, altered the free market’s risk assessments; causing dangerous overpopulation of safe havens; and, for the real economy, equally dangerous under-exploration of the risky bays where SMEs and entrepreneurs usually reside. 

The net result of it is:

Crises, like that of 2007-08, resulting from excessive exposures to what was perceived, decreed or concocted as safe, like AAA rated securities and loans to sovereigns (Greece)

Stagnation, resulting from all the stimulus, like that of QEs, not flowing freely to where they are most needed, but only populating more and more the remaining safe havens.

In other words this damn piece of regulation has our banks no longer financing the riskier future but only refinancing the safer past; and so we are doomed to doom and gloom, and to run out of safe havens.

Of course, having set the risk weight for loans to sovereigns at 0% and to We the People, the regulators also introduced, through the backdoor in 1988, a powerful pro-statism tool.

The distortions are not even acknowledged by the regulators, much less discussed.

God help needing pensioners and job seeking youth! God help us all!

PS. If you have understood this and want more details on the greatest regulatory faux pas in history you might want to read the following more extensive aide memoire.

PS. Here are some of my past explanations for dummies.

PS. Today 50% of my constituency, my grandchildren, gets to be 5 years old.