Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz should be ashamed of himself for arguing racial profiling was a major cause of the 2007/08 subprime mortgage crisis

Nobel Prize winner Joseph E. Stiglitz, in “When Shall We Overcome?” Project Syndicate, March 12, 2018 writes: “America’s financial sector targeted African-Americans for exploitation, especially in the years before the financial crisis, selling them volatile products with high fees that could, and did, explode.” Thousands lost their homes, and in the end, the disparity in wealth, already large, increased even more. One leading bank, Wells Fargo, paid huge fines for charging higher interest rates to African-American and Latino borrowers”

No! America’s financial sector did not target any special community”. It targeted extraordinary returns on equity made possible by the process of securitization teaming up with extremely lousy bank regulations.

1. A part of the financial sector targeted originating and packaging very lousy high interest rate mortgages into AAA rated securities, because that is how you make real big money in the process of securitizing. Packaging an AA rated mortgage into an AAA rated security is not even worth the effort. Packaging a $300.000, 30 year, 11% fixed rate mortgage, and getting an AAA rating on the resulting security, that would allow you to perhaps sell the mortgage as if 6% was a reasonable rate, something which would allow the team to pocket $210.000 in immediate profits.

2. In 2004, bank regulators approved that if those securities had an AAA rating, or if an AAA rated corporation (AIG) had sold a default guarantee on such securities even if it had worse credit ratings, then banks needed to hold only 1.6% in capital, meaning they could leverage 62.5 times with it. If banks thought they could only make 1% in net margin on those securities, then they could expect 62.5% yearly return on equity… and frankly who could resist such a temptation.

Put those two things together and you have 99% of the explanation you need without having to enter into any sort of racial profiling arguments.

Professor Stiglitz having served in 2009 as the chairman of the U.N. Commission on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, where he oversaw suggested proposals and commissioned a report on reforming the international monetary and financial system, should know all that very well, and so he should be ashamed of himself for doing so.

Those absolutely no good at something, lack exactly the skill they need to know that they are no good at it. John Cleese dixit.

Monty Phyton’s John Cleese, fabulously interviewed at the Commonwealth Club by Adam Savage, the host of “Mythbusters”, and in reference to a theory by David Dunning, a professor at Cornell, says around minute 57:40 the following:

“In order to know how good you are at something requires almost exactly the same aptitude as it does to be good at that think in the first place.

Which follows, as a corollary, that if you absolutely no good at something, you lack exactly the skill that you need to know that you are no good at it.

And once you realize that, you see there are thousand of people out there that have absolutely no idea of what they are doing, and so they have absolutely no idea of that they have no idea what they’re doing.”

I wonder, could John Cleese by any chance be referring to those regulators who, when deciding on the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, assigned a meager 20% to those dangerously rated AAA, and a whopping 150% for those who rated below BB- have been made so innocous for the banking system?

Here some personal observations on those cuckoo risk weighted capital requirements for banks developed by the Basel Committee, for the world to use, God Help Us!

Could this be a theme that for some strange reason TED Talks does not like me to talk about?

How long should we allow bank regulators, like the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board, to feed us their dangerous and hubris filled besserwisser bullshit?

How can any system that makes it easier for those who already have it easier to access bank credit, and harder for those who already find that harder be defined as a “fairer financial system”? https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2016/03/decreed-inequality.html

How can any system that risk weights with 20% the so dangerous AAA rated, and with 150% the so innocous below BB- rated, be defined as a system that fosters financial stability? https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2017/07/what-if-traffic-regulators-to-make-your.html

How can any regulator who does not care about the purpose of what he is regulating hold that he knows what he is doing? “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for”, John A Shedd https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2015/12/our-current-bank-regulatory-tragedy.html

How can any regulator allowing banks to leverage their equity different with different assets and not understanding or caring about how that distorts the allocation of bank credit to the real economy, hold that he knows what he is doing? http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

How many more houses built because its financing is risk weighted 35%, will have its basements occupied by unemployed children, because the risk weight for unrated SMEs and entrepreneurs is 100%? https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2017/11/crimes-against-humanity-can-also-be.html

Who should lead the Fed? There’s one initial and essential screening of the candidates.

Fact: Banks are allowed to leverage more with assets considered safe, like loans to sovereigns, the AAArisktocracy and mortgages, than with assets considered risky, like loans to SMEs and entrepreneurs.

So ask the candidates:

Does that mean “the safe” have even more and easier access to bank credit than usual and “the risky” have even less and on more expensive terms access to bank credit than usual?

If the answer is no, disqualify the candidate.

If the answer is yes, then ask: 

Do you think that might dangerously distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy?

If the answer is no, disqualify the candidate.

If the answer is yes, then ask: 

In terms of what can pose the greatest risk to the bank system, would you agree with Basel II’s risk weights of 20% for what is rated AAA to AA and 150% for what is rated below BB-?

If the answer is yes, disqualify the candidate.

If the answer is no, then ask: 

Do you agree with a 0% risk weighting of sovereigns?

If the answer is yes, the candidate should be classified as an incurable statist and accordingly dismissed.

If the answer is no, you can then proceed with the rest of the tests.

Good luck!

PS. How many of those currently in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, would pass this test?

3 tweets that should rock the world of bank regulators, and one day will

Motorcycles are riskier than cars, so if they have a choice, people prefer cars; so more die in car accidents than in motorcycle ones

Below BB- rated are much riskier than AAAs, so bankers much prefer AAAs, so big crises happens with AAAs turned risky, not with below BB-

Our bank regulators never understood that, and assigned 20% risk weight to AAAs and 150% to below BB-s So now what? http://bit.ly/1TgB6EJ

Regulators and bankers looking out for the same risks

Friends, if you ever get a chance to talk with a bank regulator ask him this, and then you’ll know they don’t know

Sir, by using risk weighted capital requirements you allow banks to leverage assets differently, something which influences differently the banks' risk-adjusted returns on equity. Don’t you think this could dangerously distort the so vital efficient allocation of bank credit to the real economy?

Sir, we see you have set a risk weight of only 20% for private assets rated AAA to AA; and one of 150% for those rated below BB-. Do you really believe that what is rated below BB- is more dangerous for the bank system than what is rated AAA to AA?

And when you then see him evading the issue by answering something else, then you have the right to know, as I do, that he and his colleagues have no idea about what they are doing… and are running scared people will find out.

PS. If you want further details on the bank regulatory monstrosity you can go HERE