#AI ChatGPT – Grok: Multilateral development banks’ help, investments or loans, what aligns best the incentives?

I asked ChatGPT: Briefly please. Around 200 words.

“If the multilateral development banks’ help came in form of investments to be paid back through dividends at a somewhat higher rate than what they would have charged on their loans, could that align better the incentives for both sides?”

ChatGPT answered:

"Yes, in many cases it could align incentives better than traditional sovereign lending.

When multilateral development banks such as World Bank, International Finance Corporation or Inter-American Development Bank provide loans, they are largely protected as creditors. They get repaid first, often regardless of whether the financed projects truly generate sustainable growth. That can weaken discipline on both sides: borrowers may overborrow, while lenders may emphasize loan volume over long-term productivity.

If support instead came more through equity-like investments paid back via dividends, incentives would become more symmetric. The development bank would earn more only if the investment genuinely succeeded and generated economic returns. That would encourage greater scrutiny of project quality, governance, transparency, and efficiency before committing funds. Borrowing countries, meanwhile, would face less pressure from fixed debt-service obligations during downturns, reducing the risk of debt crises.

Such arrangements could also encourage MDBs to focus more on enabling productive private-sector activity rather than financing politically attractive but economically weak projects.

However, there are tradeoffs. Governments may resist sharing upside returns or perceived foreign influence over strategic assets. MDBs would also face higher risks, more volatile income, and potentially political criticism if investments fail.

Still, a system with more “shared upside and shared downside” could produce healthier incentives than one dominated by ever-growing sovereign debt."

I said: Thanks! I might soon be back on this.

It replied: You’re welcome. It is an interesting line of thought because it touches the core issue of development finance: whether institutions are rewarded mainly for disbursing funds, or for helping create durable productive capacity and resilience. I’ll be glad to continue whenever you return to it.

I asked Grok: Briefly please. Around 200 words.

“If the multilateral development banks’ help came in form of investments to be paid back through dividends at a somewhat higher rate than what they would have charged on their loans, could that align better the incentives for both sides?”

Grok replied:

"Yes, it could align incentives significantly better.

Traditional MDB loans create misaligned incentives: banks get repaid regardless of outcomes (often with IMF/Paris Club bailouts), while borrowers bear full downside risk and face rigid repayment schedules that can crowd out growth. Equity-style investments—where MDBs provide capital in return for dividends at, say, 2–3 percentage points above their usual lending rates—flip this dynamic.

Both sides now have skin in the game. MDBs succeed only if the funded projects or reforms actually generate sustainable growth and cash flows; they are incentivized to pick better projects, supply smarter technical assistance, and monitor performance more rigorously. Recipients avoid the debt overhang that distorts policy (austerity, tax hikes, or default cycles). Dividends are paid only when there is profit, giving countries breathing room during bad times and sharing upside during good ones.

This structure resembles how successful development finance arms like IFC already operate in the private sector, or how venture capital aligns founder-investor interests. Politically it is harder—governments dislike ceding any ownership stake or dividend obligations—but the economic logic is sound: it turns MDBs from creditors into genuine development partners whose returns depend on the country’s success, not just its solvency.

I said: Thanks! I might soon be back on this.

It replied: You're welcome! Glad the idea resonated. I'll be right here whenever you're ready to pick it up again—happy to brainstorm more details, run some numbers, or explore counterarguments. Just say the word. 

Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by ChatGPT and Grok

 

Should not Higher Education be more of a joint venture?

Hearing so many young professionals in the USA describing their problems with debts they incurred while studying, I guess that soon some of them could be suing their Alma Maters for misrepresentation or plain failure in delivering the services offered.

Perhaps the incentive structure of the education system needs to be revised so that at least some of the higher education providers offer to collect a part of their fees through a profit participation scheme, like for instance by receiving a small percentage of the student’s future earned gross income that is above the level that the student could have been estimated to earn without further education, during his first 20 years of work.

How are then the universities going to pay for their professors now? Easy, that is what the financial markets are for. These participations in the future of our youngsters could be securitized and sold in the markets, perhaps even as a good investment for a professor’s retirement fund… of course, that is if the professor delivers on his promises.

For a university to show a willingness to invest in their own students, because they are sure of what they are giving them, might be a better marketing tool than outright grants and “we invest our money in your future” is my slogan. Also, for students, the question of what university offers to invests the most present dollars against the smallest percentage of their expected future earnings... should rank among the first when selecting an Alma Mater into which to invest their own future. 

PS. Dialoguing in 2023 with ChatGPT on this issue.

http://www.nasfaa.org/publications/2007/ghr5passed101807.html

Estudiantes ¡Alerta¡ Published March, 2007, El Universal, Caracas

PS. A tweet August 2018: “Instead of taking on debt, perhaps students should go for crowdfunding their study costs, offering to pay a percentage of their incomes during their first 15 after graduation years… perhaps even insurance companies would (should) like to invest in their future”... in a follow up tweet: Would the IRS be willing to certificate the incomes of these students for the investors?
If they did so, surely would the investors want their professors to have some, a lot, of skin in the game too?

PS. Many investments offer must be accompanied by warnings. Have you ever heard a University say: "Warning, the final financial compensations for the education you obtain with us, might not suffice to repay the debts you take on in order to study with us”?

PS. A tweet July 2019: "If anyone had sold investment plans with as little risk disclosure universities and professors do when selling investments in their education plans, and then the investments had soured, he would probably be trotting away to prison."

PS. A tweet July 2019: "Of those entire student debts some are suggesting should be condoned at taxpayers’ expense, how much should those colleges, universities and professors, who got all the money from those loans, have to absorb?"

PS. Nonetheless those who need to keep the by far larger stake in their future earnings, perhaps at least 75%, are the students. You would never ever want to share out so much that it creates incentives for them walking away from it all, one way or another.

PS. We need student debt service data, like default rates, for each university, so as to allow the market to help correct some education failures.

 

Odious Credit

I recently wrote about odious foreign public debt, that debt about which there is a current debate in the world as to whether it can be legally repudiated if it is taken on by illegitimate governments or for illegitimate ends.

The other side of the coin is odious credit. Please don’t think I’m against banks—quite the opposite. But I respect the role of the financial middlemen too highly to keep quiet when they are not doing their job right. In 1981, the representative of a foreign bank in Venezuela showed me a letter in which his boss instructed him to “give credit to the INAVI, Venezuela’s National Housing Institute. It’s the worst public institution, which means that it pays us the highest rate and, as you know, in the end it’s just as public as the best of them and Venezuela will have to pay up just the same.” Odious credit, isn’t it?

The first thing a good banker should ask a client applying for a loan is what is it for and if the answer is not satisfactory he should reject the application, regardless of the guarantees offered. Simple plain-vanilla fraud of the Parmalat kind will always exist, but the asinine way all their creditors fell into the trap makes one suspect that this is only the first case of systemic risk in the banking system: tempted by the regulators in Basel, banks subordinate their own criteria to those dictated by auditors and credit raters. This development, bad in itself, is even more serious in the case of public credit, where the what it’s for is being replaced by how much can be carried, perversely derived by calculating the level of sustainable public debt.

When I call for the total elimination of foreign public debt (which is feasible and would not require huge sacrifices in an oil rich land like Venezuela) my colleagues often argue that a certain level of debt is good and necessary for the country. This does not convince me, since it makes debt sound like electricity that must be kept at a certain voltage. Because public debt must always be paid back, regardless of whether anybody ever knew what or whom it was for, I’m fighting for the day when the private sector in Venezuela can return to the markets, freely, without having to carry that huge monkey—foreign public debt—on its back.

In my opinion, the Benemérito (the dictator Juan Vicente Gómez (1864–1935) who ruled the country between 1908 and 1935) deserved great credit for ridding Venezuela of her foreign debts He certainly knew that to shake off that vice more than patches or pieces of chewing gum are needed.

From El Universal, Caracas, April 22, 2004